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ABSTRACT: We argue that quantum theory does not allow for a generalization of the notion of
classical conditional probability by showing that the probability deﬁned by the Lüders rule,
standardly interpreted in the literature as the quantum-mechanical conditionalization rule,
cannot be interpreted as such.
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RESUMEN: Argumentamos que la teoría cuántica no admite una generalización de la noción clásica
de probabilidad condicionada. Mostramos que la probabilidad deﬁnida por la regla de
Lüders, interpretada generalmente como la regla de condicionalización mecánico-cuántica,
no puede ser interpretada como tal.
Palabras clave: mecánica cuántica; probabilidad cuántica; probabilidad condicionada; regla de Lüders;
postulado de proyección; cambio conceptual
“All the paradoxes of quantum theory arise from the implicit or
explicit application of Bayes’ axiom [...] to the statistical data of
quantum theory. This application being unjustiﬁed both physically
and mathematically” (Accardi 1984a, 298-299)
1. Introduction
Science contains many examples of concepts originating in one context and
then being extended to others. Because quite distinct concepts can have the
same reductions in restricted domains, however, determining what counts as
an appropriate extension is a tricky business. That is all the more so because
there may be no good extension at all in the new context. (Think of ‘force’ in
special relativity or ‘energy’ in general relativity.) To sort out what constitutes
an appropriate extension we need to be guided by certain formal features while
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also recognizing that some others may have to be let go. (Think, for example,
of the idea of cardinality as extending the ‘number of’ concept to inﬁnite
domain, where being a proper subset no longer implies having fewer elements.)
But formal features alone can never justify the extension. We also need to
consider issues of interpretation; including inferential or explanatory role, and
manner of application to cases.
In this paper we examine a particular question of concept extension; namely,
whether the classical notion of conditional probability can be extended to the
quantum domain. It is well-known that, because of its non-commutative struc-
ture, quantum mechanics does not assign joint probabilities to all pairs of
quantum events; that it does so for compatible ones, but not for incompatible
ones. Hence, given that conditional probability is standardly deﬁned as the pro
rata increase of a joint probability, the question arises as to whether one can
introduce an appropriate notion of conditional probability at all in quantum
mechanics.
A long-standing literature claims that the answer is ‘yes’; that it is in fact
possible to deﬁne an appropriate quantum extension of conditional probability;
namely, the probability deﬁned by the so-called ‘Lüders rule’. In the context of
quantum probability theory this rule satisﬁes the formal condition of specifying
the only probability measure on the state space that reduces to a pro rata con-
ditional probability for compatible events. Moreover, this formal condition is
analogous to a similar uniqueness property of classical conditional probability.
Thus, several authors have argued for interpreting the Lüders probabilities as
deﬁning the notion of conditional probability in quantum mechanics.1 These
authors claim that
[The Lüders rule] acquires a precise meaning, in the sense of conditional probabilities,
when quantummechanics is interpreted as a generalized probability space (Cassinelli
and Zanghí 1983, p.245)
[T]he Lüders rule is to be understood as the quantum mechanical rule for condi-
tionalizing an initial probability assignment [...] with respect to an element in the
non-Boolean possibility structure of the theory (Bub 1979b, p.218)
This view is standard in the quantum mechanical literature and is so pre-
sented in a 2009 compendium of quantum physics:
The Lüders rule is directly related to the notion of conditional probability in quan-
tum mechanics, conditioning with respect to a single event. (Busch and Lahti 2009,
p.356)
1 Explicit arguments for this view are found in Bub (1974) and in Cassinelli and Truni
(1979), which have then been expounded in Cassinelli and Zanghí (1983), Cassinelli
and Zanghí (1984), Bub (1979a), Bub (1979b) and Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981).
Modern textbooks in the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics presenting this view are,
among others, (Hughes 1989) and (Dickson 1998). In addition, in (Gudder 1979) Gudder
presents it as the standard view for ‘quantum conditional expectation’ with references
that go back to at least to 1954 (Umegaki 1954).
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A further rationale for understanding the probability deﬁned by the Lüders
rule in terms of conditional probability appears in the orthodox interpretation
of quantum mechanics. Here the Lüders rule appears as the generalized version
for degenerate eigenvalues of the so-called ‘von Neumann Projection Postulate’
(von Neumann 1932). It determines uniquely the state of the system after a
measurement of a quantity with a given result; the new density matrix can then
be used to calculate probability assignments for subsequent measurements and
thus it seemingly becomes meaningful to speak of the probability distribution
of a physical quantity given the result of a previous measurement of another
physical quantity.
We argue against both interpretations of the probability deﬁned by the
Lüders rule as a conditional probability. First, in the context of quantum
probability theory, we show that the formal analogy provided by the unique-
ness result is not suﬃcient to ground such an interpretation. For a notion of
conditional probability crucially relies on a notion of commonality between
conditioned and conditioning events which cannot be found in the quantum
domain in connection with the Lüders rule when incompatible events – the dis-
tinctively quantum events – are involved. And second, we show that the same
diﬃculties appear if one interprets the probability deﬁned by the Lüders rule
in the orthodox account as a conditional-on-measurement-outcome probability
beyond a merely instrumental reading.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the main argu-
ments in support of interpreting the Lüders rule as yielding the appropriate
notion of conditional probability in quantum theory. In section 3, we argue
that any well-deﬁned notion of conditional probability should be grounded in
a notion of commonality between conditioned and conditioning events. Then,
in section 4, showing that quantum theory lacks any such notion in connec-
tion with the Lüders rule, we conclude that quantum theory does not allow
for a generalization of classical conditional probability. Finally, in Section 5,
we argue that the conditional-on-measurement-outcome interpretation is also
inadequate. We oﬀer some concluding remarks in section 6.
2. The Lüders Rule
In classical probability theory the probability of an event A conditional on
another event B, pB(A) = p(A|B), is standardly deﬁned by the ratio of two
unconditional probabilities, namely the probability of their joint event A ∩B,
p(A ∩B), divided by the probability of the conditioning event B, p(B), i.e.
p(A|B) =
p(A ∩B)
p(B)
(1)
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Now because of its non-commutative structure, quantum mechanics does not
assign joint probabilities to all pairs of quantum events2 and, hence, the ra-
tio analysis cannot provide an analysis of conditional probability in quantum
theory. Can appropriate notion of conditional probability be introduced in
quantum mechanics?
At ﬁrst sight one might be tempted to deﬁne the conditional probability
function in a quantum probability space for two quantum projection operators
P and Q in strict analogy with the classical case as pW (P∧Q)pW (Q) , where P and Q
would be, respectively, the conditioned and conditioning event, W is a density
operator deﬁning the probability functions over the quantum event structure
L(H) (where H is the Hilbert space associated with the physical system) via
the trace rule, and ∧ stands for the algebraic relation meet in L(H).3 However,
the function thus deﬁned is not a probability measure on the quantum event
space L(H) since it is not an additive function. The non-additivity problem
arises because the conditioning event Q need not be orthogonal to two other
events P1 and P2 such that the conditioned event P is P1 + P2; and thus,
the diﬀerences that exist between Boolean and non-Boolean event structures
arise.4 Hence, to deﬁne a conditional probability function in quantum theory,
one needs, to begin with, a function linking events P and Q in an additive way.
An existence and uniqueness characterization of classical conditional prob-
ability provides the key for ﬁnding this function. Indeed, the classical condi-
tional measure deﬁned by the ratio p(A∩B)/p(B) is characterized as the only
probability measure deﬁned on the whole classical event space such that for
events A contained in B, conditionalizing on B just involves a renormalization
of the initial probability measure.5 Analogously, start by deﬁning in a quantum
probability space a conditional probability function mpW (P ) =
pW (P )
pW (Q)
for pro-
jectors P  Q (since the sub-lattice of projectors P  Q, i.e. L(Q), is Boolean,
this function is deﬁned analogously to the classical one), then, similarly to the
classical case, the function mpW (·) deﬁned in L(Q) can be extended to all L(H)
in a unique way.6
2 The relation between the non-existence of the joint distribution of two observables and
their incompatibility is subtle and depends critically on the fact that a joint distribution
is deﬁned in terms of a particular state W . See Gudder (1968), Gudder (1979), Malley
(2004), Malley and Fine (2005), Malley (2006), Malley and Fletcher (2008), Nelson
(1967) and Varadarajan (1962).
3 For a detailed formulation of quantum probability theory see, for example, Beltrametti
and Cassinelli (1981), Bub (1974) or Hughes (1989).
4 The fact that L(H) is not distributive is precisely what precludes the function from
being a probability function. Indeed, if Q is not orthogonal to two orthogonal events
P1 and P2, then (P1 + P2) ∧ Q = P1 ∧ Q + P2 ∧ Q, and hence pW [(P1 + P2) ∧ Q] =
pW (P1 ∧Q)+pW (P2∧Q) which then implies non-additivity of the probabilities deﬁned
by pW (P∧Q)
pW (Q)
.
5 See Cassinelli and Zanghí (1983), Teller and Fine (1975), Hughes (1989).
6 See Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981, p.288), Cassinelli and Zanghí (1983), Malley (2004,
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Theorem 1. Existence and Uniqueness.
Let Q be any projector in the lattice L(H) of projectors of a Hilbert space
H, dim(H)  3. Let p(·) be any probability measure on L(H), with correspond-
ing density operator W , such that pW (Q) = 0. For any P in L(Q) deﬁne
mpW (P ) =
pW (P )
pW (Q)
, where pW (P ) = Tr(WP ), as ﬁxed by Gleason’s theorem.
Then,
1. mpW (·) is a probability measure on L(Q)
2. there is an extension pW (·|Q) of mpW (·) to all L(H)
3. the extended probability measure pW (·|Q) is unique and, for all P in L(H),
is given by the density operator WQ =
QWQ
Tr(QWQ) so that
pW (P |Q) = pWQ(P ) = Tr (WQP ) =
Tr(QWQP )
Tr(QWQ)
(2)
Expression (2) is referred to as the Lüders rule. For a system in a pure state
represented by the vector ψ, it is rewritten as
pψ(P |Q) = pψQ(P ) = 〈ψQ, PψQ〉 (3)
where ψQ =
Qψ
‖Qψ‖ .
The formal result of theorem 1 is standardly invoked to support an inter-
pretation of the Lüders rule as deﬁning the appropriate notion of conditional
probability on the quantum event structure L(H). The reasoning given is as
follows:
[...] as in the classical case, the Lüders rule gives the only probability measure
that, for events P  Q, just involves a renormalization of the [initial] generalized
probability function [pW ] given by the operator W . This oﬀers strong grounds for
regarding it as the appropriate conditionalization rule for generalized probability
functions on L(H) (Hughes 1989, p.224, notation adapted).
In addition, the probabilities deﬁned by the Lüders rule reduce to classical
conditional probabilities for compatible events.7 Hence the claim is that the
Lüders rule
is the appropriate rule for conditionalizing probabilities in the non-Boolean possi-
bility structure of quantum mechanics. (Bub 1977, p.381)
pp.13-15).
7 If events P and Q are compatible then the corresponding projection operators commute so
that PQ = QP = R, where R projects onto the intersection of the subspaces associated
with P and Q. Inserting this into the Lüders rule, and using the invariance of the
cyclic permutations of the trace operation, one obtains that W (P |Q) =
Tr(QWQP )
Tr(QWQ)
=
Tr(WR)
Tr(WQ)
= p(R)
p(Q)
=
p(LP∩LQ)
p(LQ)
.
Theoria 76 (2013): 115-137
120 Isabel GUERRA BOBO
Now classical conditional probability, in addition to being characterized by
its existence and uniqueness property, is also characterized by being the only
measure which is necessarily additive with respect to conditioning events. It
turns out that the probability deﬁned by the Lüders rule lacks this additive
property and it is precisely because of this that the Lüders rule can account for
the speciﬁcally quantum interference eﬀects and match the quantum statistics.8
Thus Cassinelli and Zanghí write:
[...] the generalized conditional probability maintains all the characterizing features
of the classical one and, at the same time, it introduces typical quantum eﬀects.
The essential point is that, in the non-commutative case the theorem of compound
probabilities [or, equivalently, additivity with respect to conditioning events,] does
not hold (Cassinelli and Zanghí 1984, p.244)
The quantum notion agrees with its classical counterpart when it applies to
compatible events but diﬀers from it when incompatible events are involved.
In these cases it cannot be interpreted as a classical conditional probability
but rather is seen as providing an extension of this notion appropriate for the
quantum context.
3. Commonality and Conditional Probability
The probability deﬁned by the Lüders rule reduces to a classical conditional
probability when the events involved are compatible. As such, it is able to
capture some of the basic intuitions or essential features of the notion of con-
ditional probability. For example, the probability deﬁned by the Lüders rule
for P = Q, i.e. pW (P |P ), is one, thus preserving the intuition that the prob-
ability of any event P given itself is one; or pW (P
⊥|P ) = 0, complying with
the fact that the probability of the complement of any event given the event
itself must be zero. The crucial question, however, is whether this probability
can be understood as an extension of classical conditional probability to the
quantum context, that is, for incompatible events which are the distinctively
quantum events.
To illustrate this question, consider a spin 12 particle in a state correspond-
ing to a positive value of spin along the z-axis, i.e. ψs+z . The probability for
the event P = Ps+z corresponding to a positive value of spin along the z-axis
in this state is one. What is the probability for this same event conditional on
another event Q such that pW (Q) = 0, say Q = Pφ, with φ = aψs+z + bψs−z
(|a|2+ |b|2 = 1),9 a linear combination of the event corresponding to a positive
and a negative value of spin along the z-axis?
According to what we know about classical conditional probability, one
might begin by considering the two following intuitions. On the one hand, the
8 See Cassinelli and Zanghí (1984). See also Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981, pp. 281-285).
9 For Q = Pφ, φ = aψs+z + bψs−z and ψ = ψs+z , pψ(Q) = |〈φ|ψs+z 〉|
2 = |a|2. Hence,
pψ(Q) = 0 if a = 0.
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probability of Ps+z conditional on Pφ should be equal to one for, given that the
unconditional probability of Ps+z is already one, considering any other event
whose probability is not zero should leave this value unaltered. On the other
hand, the probability of Ps+z conditional on Pφ should seemingly not take any
value diﬀerent from zero, be it one or any other value. For Ps+z and Pφ seem
to have nothing in common since the intersection of their ranges is zero. And
hence the conditional probability of Ps+z given Pφ should be zero. However, the
probability pψs+z (Ps+z |Pφ) deﬁned by the Lüders rule is not generally assigned
either the value one or zero; rather its value can range from 0 to 1 depending on
the value of a given that pψs+z (Ps+z |Pφ) = |a|
2.10 How can we then understand
the probability pψs+z (Ps+z |Pφ) as the probability of the event Ps+z informed
or qualiﬁed by the event Pφ?
The notion of conditional probability is that of the probability of an event –
the conditioned event – informed or qualiﬁed by the occurrence of another event
– the conditioning event. In classical probability theory it is easy to understand
why the ratio formula (1) can capture this notion.11 Indeed, imagine a fair die
is about to be tossed. What is the probability that it lands with ‘1’ showing
up conditional on or given that the outcome is an odd number?
First, if we know that the outcome of the throw is an odd number, then
the appropriate sample space for calculating the probability of ‘1’ is not S =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} anymore; rather S gets replaced by the set of odd outcomes
Sodd = {1, 3, 5}. Second, there are many probability measures on this new
sample space; what speciﬁcally deﬁnes the conditional probability measure is
that the sample space changes from S to Sodd and nothing else. That is, the
conditional probability given ‘odd’, by deﬁnition, diﬀers from the original one
solely by taking into account the qualiﬁcation of an odd outcome. This means
that one has to eliminate the points in S that are not in Sodd (2, 4 and 6),
without altering the relative probability of the points which remain (1, 3 and
5), i.e. by increasing the latter’s value ‘pro rata’. Thus, p(1| odd) is derived
from the initial probability measure by dividing the initial measure by the
initial probability of odd, i.e. p(1| odd) =
p(1)
p(odd) =
1/6
1/2 =
1
3 .
In this example A = {1} is a subset of B = {odd}; for general subsets
A that are not necessarily subsets of B, as for example A = {1, 2, 3} and
B = {odd}, one has to consider only the probability of the sample points in A
that are also in B and disregard the rest. For the sample points in A that are
not also in B will not be possible outcomes in the new event space SB and,
therefore, will be assigned zero probability. Thus, in general, the conditional
probability measure on B is generated by looking at the probability of the
intersection A ∩ B of any measurable A with B, and increasing it pro rata
10Given ψQ = Qψ‖Qψ‖ =
Pφψs+z
‖Pφψs+z‖
= φ,ψ(P |Q) = 〈ψQ, PψQ〉 = 〈φ, Ps+zφ〉 = |〈φ|ψs+z 〉|
2 =
|a|2.
11 We do not consider the diﬃculties that appear in interpreting the ratio formula as a
classical conditional probability. See Hájek (2003), Hájek (2009).
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(so that the new conditional measure remains normalized). For the notion of
classical conditional probability the relation of commonality between the two
events is, hence, the crucial aspect; it determines how the sample space changes
and what events one has to consider. And then a pro rata adjustment of the
initial probability function suﬃces.
More generally, a relation of commonality between the conditioning and
the conditioned events seems to be essential to any notion of conditional prob-
ability. It does not have to, as in the classical case, be captured by looking at
the subset intersection of the two events; but some kind of link between the
conditioning and conditioned events seems necessary if the occurrence of the
former is to determine how the probability of the latter changes.12 Is there
then some quantum notion of commonality between the events Ps+z and Pφ to
ground thinking of the probability deﬁned by the Lüders rule ψs+z (Ps+z |Pφ)
as a conditional one?
4. No Quantum Notion of Commonality
If the probability deﬁned by the Lüders rule is to be understood as a conditional
probability for incompatible quantum events, it cannot rely on the classical
notion of commonality; that is, one cannot think of a notion of commonality
between projectors in terms of the intersection of their subspaces. Rather,
one needs a notion of commonality which can ﬁrst, cope with the fact that
W (P |Q) is in general non-zero for events P and Q such that the intersection
of their ranges is zero, and second, determine the particular non-zero value
which the Lüders rule actually assigns W (P |Q).
13
A look at the probability deﬁned by the Lüders rule quickly suggests the
following one. By the invariance of the trace under cyclic permutations, this
12 I take as a starting point, without giving further arguments, that if the occurrence of
an event is to determine how the probability of another changes then some kind of link
between both events seems necessary. (A similar situation occurs when discussing the
notion of negation in the Appendix.) The diﬃculty lies in evaluating what constitutes a
proper conceptual extension. Indeed, for a notion to be the conceptual extension of an-
other there needs to be some ‘core’ meaning which both concepts share and carries over
the boundary between the old and the new theoretical context. However, in general,
the concept of the new theory will have some features in common with the old concept
and some completely new features. And there do not seem to be clear cut criteria to
determine which of the properties of the old concept the new concept should necessar-
ily retain to regard it as an extension of the old one rather than a diﬀerent concept
altogether. I take it that commonality is a core feature of the concept of conditional
probability.
13The fact that a notion of commonality based on subspace intersection cannot underwrite
a quantum notion of conditional probability is easily understood. Indeed, this notion
corresponds to deﬁning conditional probability by the ratio pW (P∧Q)
pW (Q)
, which we showed
does not deﬁne a probability function over L(H).
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probability can be written as W (P |Q) =
Tr(QWQP )
Tr(QWQ) =
Tr(WQPQ)
Tr(QWQ) . If P is
a one-dimensional projection operator onto the ray α, i.e. P = Pα, one can
write QPαQ as PQα,
14 i.e. the projector onto the (non-normalized) vector Qα,
thus obtaining W (Pα|Q) =
Tr(WPQα)
pW (Q)
= pW (PQα)pW (Q) . In analogue fashion to the
classical process for generating the conditional probability measure on B by
looking at the probability of the intersection A ∩B of any measurable A with
B, and increasing it pro rata, one could argue that in quantum theory the
projector PQα represents the common quantum projector of Q and Pα which
is assigned a probability by means of the standard trace rule, and then is
increased pro rata. If P is not one-dimensional, then it is the eﬀect operator
QPQ which represents the common projector of P and Q.
One would then, seemingly, not only explain why one should assign a non-
zero probability to projector P conditional on projector Q when P ∧ Q = 0,
but also why it takes the particular non-zero value the Lüders rule assigns it.
Indeed, for the spin 12 example even if the intersection of the ranges of Ps+z
and Pφ, where φ = aψs+z + bψs−z , is zero, i.e. Ps+z ∧ Pφ = 0, their common
projector is given by PQP = PQα = Pa∗φ, and thus probability of this common
projector increased pro rata yields ψs+z (Ps+z |Pφ) =
pψs+z (Pa∗φ)
pψs+z (Pφ)
= |a|2. Hence,
by appealing to a notion of commonality of quantum projectors based on their
projective geometry, it looks like the probability deﬁned by the Lüders rule
could be interpreted as a conditional probability.
This projective reading, however, only holds at a superﬁcial level. First,
it seems counterintuitive to regard QPQ as the common projector of Q and
P . For in W (P |Q) the common projector is the operator QPQ, while in
W (Q|P ) it is PQP , which are in general diﬀerent from each other. And yet,
why should they be diﬀerent if they are both supposed to represent what P
and Q have in common? One could bite the bullet and simply stipulate that
QPQ is by deﬁnition the common projector of P and Q in the projective lat-
tice L(H), and argue that our intuitions about what is counterintuitive are
not reliable; for these are molded on Boolean structures and we are consider-
ing projection operators which precisely have a non-Boolean structure. These
responses, however, only make the understanding of the probability deﬁned by
the Lüders rule as a conditional probability too superﬁcial to be considered
as such given that they do not really engage the interpretive question. They
provide no understanding of why the common projector of P and Q is QPQ,
nor of why the common quantum projector for the probability of P conditional
on Q is diﬀerent form that of Q conditional on P .
Moreover, important diﬃculties appear as soon as one considers whether
this understanding in terms of projection operators can provide a rationale
for thinking of the probability deﬁned by the Lüders rule as a conditional
probability for the values of physical quantities of a quantum system. Indeed,
14 For any vector φ, (QPαQ)φ = QPα(Qφ) = Qα〈α,Qφ〉 = Qα〈Qα, φ〉 = PQαφ.
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it applies directly to projection operators on a Hilbert space H but these
are only physically meaningful through their associated eigenvalues. Hence,
the projective reading would be an adequate interpretation of the probability
deﬁned by the Lüders rule only in so far as it could underwrite a quantum
notion of conditional probability in terms of physically relevant values. That is,
a reading of W (P |Q) as the probability for value p – the eigenvalue associated
with P – conditional on value q – the eigenvalue associated with Q.
Now to ground this notion of quantum conditional probability one would
need to ﬁnd a notion of commonality in terms of the physical values p and q
that would somehow correspond to the operator QPQ. The problem is, how-
ever, two-fold. First, there are many cases in which there simply seems to be
no understanding of the conjunction of two physical values p and q of a quan-
tum system. And second, in those cases in which the event ‘p and q’ can be
represented in terms of the projection operators P and Q, it is represented by
P ∧ Q rather than by QPQ, and neither these operators nor the probability
assigned to them are in general equal. Only if P and Q are compatible projec-
tors do all these notions line up – ‘p and q’ can be represented by the projector
P ∧ Q, which in turn is equivalent to the common operator QPQ – and the
probability W (P |Q) can be read as the pro rata increase of ‘p and q’.
Begin with the ﬁrst problem. The diﬃculty here is directly related to those
quantum scenarios in which interference eﬀects are present; these arise when
the ‘conditioning’ event Q is not drawn back to the occurrence of the single
events Qi that compose it. For example, consider a spin-1 particle and two
Stern-Gerlach devices that separate the possible values of the spin component,
viz. −1, 0, 1, along the x- and y- axis (Beltrametti and Cassinelli 1981, pp.
281-285).
Let Q1 and Q2 be the events ‘the x-component is +1’ and ‘the x-component
is 0’, respectively, i.e. Q1 = Psx+1 and Q2 = Psx0 ; and let P be the event ‘the
y-component is +1’, i.e. P = Psy+1 . The probability deﬁned by the Lüders
rule for P = Psy+1 and Q = Psx+1 + Psx0 , i.e. ψ(Psy+1 |Psx+1 + Psx0 ), agrees
with the empirical probability for ﬁnding the y-component of spin to be +1
in the experiment shown in ﬁgure 1. The question is whether this probability
can be interpreted as the probability that the y-component of spin is +1 when
informed or qualiﬁed by the x-component of spin being +1 or 0. As we have
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argued, for this to be so we need to ﬁnd an understanding of the conjunction
of physical values sy+1 and sx+1 or sx0 , whose probability increased pro rata
yields such a notion of conditional probability.
In the quantum event structure L(H) one can deﬁne algebraic relations
between the projection operators representing quantum events which are the
counterparts of set-union, set-intersection, and set-complementation. These
are, respectively, P ∨Q, P ∧Q, and P⊥. And given that in classical logic the
logical relations between events correspond naturally to the algebraic relations
between the subsets that represent those events – A or B is represented by
A∪B; A and B is represented by (A∩B); and not A is represented by Ac – the
straightforward suggestion is, hence, that the algebraic relations in L(H) cor-
respond to ‘quantum logical relations’: ‘∨’ is to be interpreted as providing an
extension of the classical or in the quantum domain, ‘∧’ as the quantum logical
and , and ‘⊥’ as the quantum logical ‘not’. Thus, the event the y-component
of spin is +1 and the x-component is +1 or 0 would be represented by the
projector Psy+1 ∧ (Psx+1 ∨ Psx0 ).
However, the analogy between the correspondence of the algebraic and
logical relations in classical and quantum mechanics turns out to hold only
at a purely formal level, and thus the algebraic relations ‘∨’ and ‘⊥’ of L(H)
cannot be understood, respectively, as generalized or extended notions of the
ordinary logical concepts of disjunction and negation. Brieﬂy, the diﬃculty
is that the operator ‘⊥’ cannot be interpreted as logical negation or as an
extension of it. And this, in turn, precludes understanding ‘∨’ as the quantum
extension of ordinary disjunction. (See the Appendix for a detailed argument.)
In terms of our example, the problem is that Psx+1 ∨ Psx0 (which is equal to
Psx+1 + Psx0 since the projection operators are orthogonal) dose not seem to
allow its interpretation as the event ‘sx+1 or sx0 ’, and hence the projector
Psy+1 ∧ (Psx+1 ∨ Psx0 ) cannot be read as the event ‘sy+1 and sx+1 or sx0’. For
the truth conditions that quantum mechanics (with its reliance on the e-e
link) dictates for ‘∨’ do not allow its understanding as logical disjunction or
an extension of it.
Consider, for example, the assignment of truth values dictated by a general
(pure) state ψ = c+1ψsx+1 +c0ψsx0 +c−1ψsx−1 . The disjunct Psx+1 ∨Psx0 is true
in ψ (because ψ is an eigenstate of PI), while neither Psx+1 nor Psx0 are true
in ψ (because if both c+1 and c0 are diﬀerent from zero, ψ is not an eigenstate
of Psx+1 nor of Psx0 ). Hence, for the system in state ψ, Sx does not take value
+1 nor does it take value 0, yet Sx does take some value. In other words, to
read Psx+1 ∨Psx0 as ‘sx+1 or sx0 ’ only makes sense if we hold that the electron
has an x-component of spin +1 or 0, even though it is false that it has an
x-component of spin +1 and it is also false that it has an x-component of spin
0. This certainly appears to preclude understanding ‘∨’ as logical disjunction.
Moreover, even if one were to accept that the event ‘sy+1 and sx+1 or sx0 ’
is somehow represented by the projector Psy+1 ∧ (Psx+1 ∨Psx0 ), the probability
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assigned to this projector increased pro rata would still not agree with the
probability dictated by the Lüders rule given that is diﬀerent from the projec-
tor employed by the Lüders rule, i.e. QPQ = (Psx+1 +Psx0 )Psy+1 (Psx+1 +Psx0 ).
This is the second problem we pointed to before. Hence, given that there
is no notion of commonality in terms of the physical values sy+1 and sx+1
or sx0 that corresponds to the operator QPQ, it seems that the probability
ψ(Psy+1 |Psx+1 + Psx0 ) deﬁned by the Lüders rule cannot be interpreted as a
conditional probability for the physical values associated to these projectors.
To conclude, the fact that the probability W (P |Q) deﬁned by the Lüders
rule agrees with classical conditional probability in their shared domain of ap-
plication, i.e. compatible events, does not guarantee that outside this domain,
i.e. incompatible events, it retains enough interpretive content so as to justify
regarding it as a genuine extension of the classical notion; and this regardless
of the fact that the probability deﬁned by the Lüders rule is the only possible
candidate for a quantum notion of conditional probability (recall theorem 1).
Although superﬁcially it may seem that the uniqueness argument of section 2
underwrites a quantum notion of conditional probability, we have argued that
the notion of the probability of an event qualiﬁed by the occurrence of another
requires a notion of commonality between events which cannot be found in the
quantum domain.15
5. A Rationale for Measurement Results?
Now an orthodox interpreter of quantum theory would try to resist our conclu-
sion by claiming that there is a notion of conditional probability in quantum
mechanics if physical values are interpreted as measurement results. Indeed,
the Lüders rule appears in the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics as the generalized version for degenerate eigenvalues of the so-called ‘von
Neumann Projection Postulate’ (von Neumann 1932). It determines uniquely
the state of the system after a measurement of a quantity with a given result;
the new density matrix can then be used to calculate probability assignments
for subsequent measurements and thus it seemingly becomes meaningful to
speak of the probability distribution of a physical quantity given the result of
a previous measurement of another physical quantity.
In more detail, imagine we perform an ideal ﬁrst-kind (i.e. non-destructive
and repeatable) measurement on a system in state W of a certain observable,
where Q belongs to its spectral decomposition, and ﬁnd measurement outcome
q. According to the Lüders projection postulate the new state of the system will
be given by the density operatorWq =
QWQ
Tr(QWQ) . If we then perform a measure-
ment of a second observable, where P belongs to its spectral decomposition,
15My claim agrees with that presented by Leifer and Spekkens, namely ‘the assertion that
the projection postulate is analogous to Bayesian conditioning is based on a misleading
analogy.’ Leifer and Spekkens (2012, p.3), but our reasons are diﬀerent.
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the probability to ﬁnd measurement outcome p in this second measurement is
given by the trace rule as
W (p|q) ≡ pWq(p) = Tr
(
QWQ
Tr(QWQ)
P
)
(4)
(For a system in a pure state ψ, the state of the system ‘collapses’ upon mea-
surement to the state ψq =
Qψ
‖Qψ‖ , i.e. the normalized projection of ψ onto
the eigenspace belonging to q, and (4) reads ψ(p|q) = pψq(p) = 〈ψq, Pψq〉).
Hence, the proposal is that the probabilities deﬁned by the Lüders projection
postulate W (p|q) deﬁne the notion of conditional probability in quantum
mechanics for measurement results: the probability of measurement outcome
p conditional on measurement outcome q.16
Now if when one says the probability of a certain outcome p of an exper-
iment conditional on a previous measurement result q is pWq as given by the
Lüders rule, one only means that if the experiment is repeated many times
one expects that the fraction of those which give the outcome p when out-
come q has been previously found is roughly pWq , then we have no quarrel
with the conditional-on-measurement-outcome interpretation. But if one goes
a step further in trying to understand pWq as a genuine conditional proba-
bility then diﬃculties arise. This interpretive problem is standardly accepted
for primitive unconditional probabilities: if when one says the probability of
a certain outcome p of an experiment is pW as given by the trace rule, one
only means that if the experiment is repeated many times one expects that the
fraction of those which give the outcome p is roughly pW , then no problems
arise. But what does this probability really mean beyond this instrumental
understanding? This is yet an unresolved question.17
For the conditional probability notion the interpretive problems are those
we discussed on the previous section. Put in terms of measurement results,
the fact that one learns measurement outcome q is the case is not informative
of how the probability of measurement outcome p should change from pW as
given by the trace rule to pWq as given by the Lüders rule. One knows how to
calculate the new probability pWq by applying the Lüders rule, but the change
from pW to pWq cannot be understood on account of the relation between
measurement results p and q as it happens in the classical case. Hence, it
seems that the orthodox interpreter cannot provide an adequate conditional
interpretation of the probability deﬁned by the Lüders projection postulate
16Note that this probability – probability for a measurement outcome given another mea-
surement outcome – is diﬀerent from the orthodox quantum probabilities for measure-
ment outcomes conditional on measurements. The latter are conditional on the role
of background conditions which specify the conditions in eﬀect at the assessment of a
probability function – in this case, the measurement procedure – while the former are
conditional on speciﬁc measurement results.
17 See for example Pitowsky (1989).
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as a conditional-on-measurement-outcome probability over and above a purely
instrumental reading.
6. Conclusion
Extending concepts into new domains is always a tricky business. As we have
seen, it is not suﬃcient to show that there are some formal analogies between
the old and the extended concept. In addition, it is essential to evaluate whether
these analogies can provide enough interpretive content so as to justify regard-
ing the concept in the new domain as an extension or a generalization of the
old one.
Trying to extend the concept of conditional probability in the probabilis-
tic framework of the quantum theory is especially tricky. In this case, formal
analogies, which suggest the probabilities deﬁned by the Lüders rule as the
natural extensions, appear to not provide enough interpretive content so as
to justify regarding them as extensions of classical conditional probabilities to
the quantum context from a meaningful perspective. It seems doubtful whether
there is any natural extension of conditionality that ﬁts the non-commutative
structure of the quantum theory – a domain where joint events make no sense
– and illuminates how it is applied. Even though there exists a well-deﬁned
notion of conditional probability for compatible quantum events which can be
extended uniquely to apply to general quantum events – the so-called Lüders
rule – we have argued that this extension is merely formal and does not carry
the required interpretative weight.
7. Appendix: Interpreting Quantum Logic
Our conclusion in section 4 that the probability W (P |Q) deﬁned by the
Lüders rule cannot be read as the probability of physical value p conditional
on physical value q (where p and q are the eigenvalues associated with pro-
jectors P and Q) relied on two claims, namely that (1) in those scenarios in
which interference eﬀects are present, the projector Q = Q1 ∨ Q2 cannot be
interpreted as the event ‘q1 or q2’, and thus P ∧ Q cannot be understood as
‘p and q1 or q2’; and (2) in those cases in which the event ‘p and q’ can be
represented in terms of the projection operators P and Q, it is represented by
P ∧ Q rather than by QPQ, and neither these operators nor the probability
assigned to them are in general equal. In this appendix we provide a detailed
defense of the ﬁrst claim by showing why disjunction ‘∨’ cannot be understood
as an extension of the logical relation ‘or’.
As we saw in section 4, in the quantum event structure L(H) one can
deﬁne algebraic relations between the projection operators representing quan-
tum events which are the counterparts of set-union, set-intersection, and set-
complementation. Many of the relations between the quantum algebraic re-
lations are similar to those between the classical ones. For example, just as
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(Ac)c = A holds for set-complementation, (P⊥)⊥ = P holds for subspace-
complementation; or just as A ∪ Ac = S in F(S), P ∨ P⊥ = I in L(H); or
similarly to (A ∩ Ac)c = S, we have (P ∧ P⊥)⊥ = I.
Now, in classical logic, the logical relations between events (or propositions
representing those events) correspond naturally to the algebraic relations be-
tween the subsets that represent those events. The suggestion is, thus, that,
given the similarities between the classical and the quantum algebraic relations,
the algebraic relations in L(H) correspond to ‘quantum logical relations’, where
it is assumed that these provide some kind of extension of our ordinary logical
notions in the quantum context. Thus, the algebraic relation ‘∨’ between quan-
tum projectors is interpreted as the quantum logical ‘or’ for quantum events.
Similarly, the algebraic relation ‘∧’ is taken to correspond to the quantum
logical ‘and’, and ‘⊥’ is read as the quantum logical ‘not’.
However, just as with conditional probability, these analogies turn out to
hold only at a purely formal level. That is, the algebraic relations ‘∨’ and ‘⊥’
for quantum projectors cannot be understood, respectively, as generalized or
extended notions of the ordinary logical concepts of disjunction and negation
from any physically meaningful perspective. And hence, for example, even if
formally one has (P⊥)⊥ = P , one should not interpret this equation as double
negation; nor should one interpret P ∨P⊥ or (P ∧P⊥)⊥ as the logical laws of
excluded middle and non-contradiction respectively.
Fine (1972) argues for this conclusion by constructing the analogue to quan-
tum logic for a simple, two-dimensional system. In this logic it is clear that the
meaning of the algebraic relations diﬀers substantially from the meaning of the
ordinary logical relations. And hence, the conclusion that the former cannot
be regarded as extensions of the latter. These conclusions then carry over to
quantum logic. Let us ﬁrst consider this toy model and then look at quantum
logic.
7.1. A Toy Model
Consider the location of a certain point P on a given circle C. Suppose that for
the location of P there are three accessible regions: (1) the center of the circle,
(2) the entire area of the circle and (3) any diameter of the circle. Any sentence
of the form ‘P is on X’, where X is one of the accessible regions, corresponds
to an elementary sentence. The idea is to construct a logic from the elementary
sentences by introducing sentential connectives and truth conditions.
Let us ﬁrst introduce the binary connective ‘∧’ such that for elementary
sentences ‘P is on X’ and ‘P is on Y ’, the conjunction
‘P is on X’ ∧ ‘P is on Y ’ ≡ ‘P is on Z’
where Z describes the region of the circle that is the intersection of the X
and Y regions. One can readily verify that the intersection of two accessible
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regions is again an accessible region and, therefore, that conjunction is well-
deﬁned. The functor ‘∧’ is just the usual sentential conjunction with regard to
the interpretation of sentences as locating the particle on the circle.
It is also the usual conjunction with regard to truth conditions. In eﬀect,
each possible location L for the particle P that is on the circle but not at the
center yields an assignment of truth values according to the prescription ‘P
is on X’ is true under L iﬀ under L, P is on X. Hence the sentence ‘P is
on the center of the circle’ is false under all truth assignments (and will play
the role of ‘the false’ in this system.) And the semantic rule for conjunction is
thus deﬁned as follows. If φ, ψ are elementary sentences, an assignment L of
truth values to the elementary sentences automatically assigns truth values to
conjunctions according to the rule ‘φ ∧ ψ’ is true under L iﬀ ‘φ’ and ‘ψ’ are
true under L. The functor ‘∧’ is thus also the usual conjunction with regard
to truth conditions.18
The situation with negation is, however, quite diﬀerent. If one wanted to
introduce the usual negation, then one should introduce a unary functor ‘∼’
as
∼ (P is on X) ≡ P is in the circle but not on the regions described by
X
The problem with the ‘∼’ deﬁnition of negation is that the set of elementary
sentences is not closed under it. For example, if X describes a diameter, then
∼ (P is on X) describes the circle minus a diameter, which is not an accessible
region. For the elementary sentences to be closed under negation ‘∼’ one can
either expand the list of accessible regions so as to include with each region
on the list its complement relative to the circle (and then introduce ordinary
negation as above), or retain the previous list of accessible regions by intro-
ducing a unary functor under which the elementary sentences are closed. The
new functor will, therefore, be diﬀerent from the ordinary sentential negation.
Consider the second option and deﬁne the unary functor ‘¬’ as
¬(P is on X) ≡ P is on X⊥
where if R is the region described by X, then X⊥ describes (1) the center of
the circle if R is the whole circle, (2) the whole circle if R is the center of
the circle, and (3) the diameter perpendicular to R if R is a diameter. Note
that ‘¬’ satisﬁes the desired involutary property, namely ¬(¬P ) = P . Also, an
assignment L of truth values to the elementary sentences automatically assigns
truth values to ¬φ according to the rule ‘if ‘φ’ is true under L, then ‘¬φ’ is
false under L’. However, contrary to conjunction, the functor ‘¬’ is not the
usual logical negation, both with regard to the interpretation of sentences as
locating the particle on the circle and with regard to truth conditions.
18 Note that the semantic notions of validity and logical equivalence are deﬁned as usual,
namely φ is valid iﬀ φ is true under all assignments of truth values, and φ is logically
equivalent to ψ iﬀ φ and ψ have the same truth value under all assignments.
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First, to deny that point P is in diameter X is not to assert that it is
in the diameter perpendicular to X, as ‘negation’ ¬ prescribes. Indeed, the
point could be anywhere in the circle! Second, whereas the above semantic
rule holds for ‘negation’ ‘¬’, its converse – while true for ordinary negation –
does not hold here. For example, suppose that the assignment L derives from
P being on diameter X. If φ is the sentence ‘P is on Y ’, where Y describes a
diameter not perpendicular to the X diameter, then both ‘P is on Y ’ and ‘P
is on Y ⊥’ are false under L; that is, both ‘φ’ and ‘¬φ’ are false under L. The
trouble arises because if it is false that P is on a certain diameter, it does not
follow that P is on the perpendicular diameter. Thus, even though the set of
elementary sentences is closed under functor ‘¬’, it is not ordinary negation
nor an extension of it.
Finally, given conjunction and negation, one can introduce disjunction by
the De Morgan Laws (φ∨ψ) ≡ ¬(¬φ∧¬ψ). The semantics forced on disjunction
by this deﬁnition are as follows:
If ‘φ’ is true under L or ‘ψ’ is true under L, then ‘φ∨ ψ’ is true under L
The converse, however, does not hold, that is, the disjunction can be true
although neither disjunct is true. For example, if φ, ψ locate P in distinct
diameters, then the disjunction (φ ∨ ψ) is true under all assignments of truth
values, since it merely says that P is somewhere on the circle. And under an
assignment in which P is on neither of the mentioned diameters, each disjunct
will be false, whereas the disjunction as a whole will be true. Also notice that
if φ, ψ locate P in distinct diameters, the conjunction (φ ∧ ψ) is false under
all assignments, since it would place P on the center of the circle. Thus, the
algebraic relation ‘∨’ cannot be understood as disjunction nor as an extension
of it.
To ﬁnish, let us look at the distributive law. Suppose φ1, φ2, φ3 locate P
on distinct diameters R1, R2, R3 respectively. The conjunction (φ1 ∨ φ2) ∧ φ3
locates P on R3 while the disjunction (φ1 ∧ φ3) ∨ (φ2 ∧ φ3) locates P on the
center of the circle. Thus the latter disjunction is false under every assignment
of truth values while the former conjunction is true under the assignment where
P is on R3. Hence (φ1 ∨ φ2) ∧ φ3 = (φ1 ∧ φ3) ∨ (φ2 ∧ φ3), and the distributive
law does not hold in this ‘circular logic’.
The distributive law fails due to the oddities of disjunction, which in turn
derive from the nonstandard ‘negation’ ‘¬’. But given that the latter diﬀers
in meaning (with regard to both interpretation and truth conditions) form
ordinary negation, the failure of the distributive law for this system does not
illustrate how the ordinary law of distributivity might be false. To assert the
distributive law in this circular logic is not to assert the ordinary distributive
law at all.
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7.2. Quantum Logic
Similarly to the deﬁnition of ‘negation’ ‘¬’ in the ‘circular logic’, quantum
logic also chooses the second option when deﬁning quantum ‘negation’, or
nequation, as Fine calls it, where the ‘q’ reminds us of quantum theory and the
diﬀerence in spelling helps us to keep in mind the diﬀerence between negation
and nequation. The features of ‘circular logic’ hence have their corresponding
analogues in quantum ‘logic’. Let us consider them.
In quantum logic the elementary sentences are of the form ‘observable A
takes a value in the Borel set ’ – what we have been calling quantum events
PA(). For operators with discrete spectrum, the elementary sentences are
of the form ‘observable A takes a value ai’, where ai is an eigenvalue of the
operator A, and are represented by the projector PAai . (Note that the sentences
or events are referred to a ﬁxed system.) The assignments of truth values are
simply the various states ψ of the system.19 Indeed, for an elementary sentence
Pai and state ψ
Pai is true under an assignment Vψ (i.e. in state ψ) iﬀ
ψ is an eigenstate of Pai
20
The unary functor ⊥ is deﬁned on the quantum event P ∈ L(H) as
P⊥ ≡ orthogonal projection onto the complement of the closed subspace
spanned by the range of P
An assignment Vψ of truth values to the elementary sentences automatically
assigns truth values to the nequation of Pai , i.e. (Pai)
⊥, according to the rule
If ‘Pai ’ is true under Vψ, then ‘(Pai)
⊥’ is false under Vψ
Similarly to ‘¬’ in the ‘circular logic’, nequation ‘⊥’ cannot be interpreted as
logical negation nor an extension of it. For example, consider a two dimensional
Hilbert space and an observable A with a discrete and non-degenerate spec-
trum A = a1Pa1 + a2Pa2 . For Pa1 and Pa2 (which are orthogonal projectors),
nequation prescribes that to deny that event Pa1 , i.e. observable A takes value
a1, is the case is to assert that event Pa2 , i.e. observable A takes value a2, is
the case. But again this does not seem to make sense. For the event could be
any of the possible combinations of Pa1 and Pa2 , i.e. c1Pa1 + c2Pa2 with b = 0
and |c1|
2 + |c2|
2 = 1, in which case A would simply take no value for state ψ.
Moreover, whereas the above semantic rule holds for nequation ‘⊥’, its
converse – while true for ordinary negation – does not hold here. For example,
suppose that the assignment Vψ derives from A taking no value, e.g. ψ =
19For ease of exposition we will stick to pure states ψ and operators with discrete spectrum.
20We use Vψ to note an assignment of truth values rather than Lψ, which can be confused
with subspace Lψ.
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c1α1 + c2α2, with c1 and c2 diﬀerent from zero. If Paj is the sentence ‘A takes
value aj ’, then both ‘A takes value aj ’ and ‘A takes a value ai diﬀerent from
aj’ are false under Vψ (because ψ is not an eigenstate of either). That is, both
‘Paj ’ and ‘(Paj )
⊥’ are false under Vψ and thus the semantic rule ‘if ‘(Pai)
⊥’ is
true under Vψ, then ‘Pai ’ is false under Vψ’ does not hold. The trouble arises
because nequation of (Pψ), i.e. it is false that A takes no value, implies (Pψ)
⊥,
i.e. A takes no value, and not Pai , i.e. A takes a determinate value (any of
the eigenvalues of A), as it would intuitively do if it could be interpreted as
negation.
If one wanted to introduce ordinary negation, then one would deﬁne the
negation of ‘A takes the value ai’ as the assertion that ‘either A takes no
value or it takes a value corresponding to an eigenvalue diﬀerent from ai’.
This negation is true under an assignment Vψ just in case ψ is either not
an eigenstate of A, i.e. ψ is a superposition of eigenstates of A with distinct
eigenvalues, or ψ is an eigenstate of A but with eigenvalue diﬀerent from ai, i.e.
ψ lies in the subspace (Lai)
⊥ orthogonal to the space spanned by Pai . Thus the
negation of ‘A takes the value ai’ is true under Vψ iﬀ either ψ is a superposition
of eigenstates of A with distinct eigenvalues, or Vψ lies in (Lai)
⊥.
Both alternatives of deﬁning negation are perfectly meaningful and experi-
mentally veriﬁable. Nevertheless, as we have seen, quantum logic does not use
this last negation. It instead focuses on only one of the alternatives above and
takes the quantum ‘negation’ to be nequation, and thus takes the ‘negation’
of ‘A takes the value ai’ to be ‘A takes a value corresponding to an eigenvalue
diﬀerent from ai’, which is true under Vψ just in case ψ lies in (Lai)
⊥. No-
tice that nequation corresponds to negation for compatible observables, but
is completely diﬀerent from it for incompatible events. Indeed, the nequation
of ‘A takes no value under Vψ’, i.e. (Pψ)
⊥, is also ‘A takes no value under
Vψ’, and thus has nothing to do with negation. Hence, similarly to quantum
conditional probability, the fact that nequation is co-extensive with negation
in their shared domain of application, does not guarantee that outside that
domain the nequation can be regarded as an extension or a generalization of
negation.
Conjunction is deﬁned in quantum ‘logic’ analogously to that of the ‘cir-
cular logic’:
‘Pai ∧ Paj ’ is true under Vψ iﬀ ‘Pai ’ and ‘Paj ’ are true under Vψ.
As we can see, the functor ‘∧’ is just the ordinary relation ‘and’. Disjunction
is also deﬁned in quantum ‘logic’ analogously to disjunction in the ‘circular
logic’:
If ‘Pai ’ is true under Vψ or ‘Paj ’ is true under Vψ, then ‘Pai ∨Paj ’ is true
under Vψ
and thus presents analogue problems for its interpretation as an extension of
the logical ‘or’. Indeed, the converse of this semantic rule for disjunction does
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not hold; that is, the disjunction can be true although neither disjunct is true.
For example, for an assignment of truth values Vψ with ψ = c1α1 + c2α2 and
observable A = a1Pa1 +a2Pa2 , the disjunct Pa1 ∨Pa2 is true in ψ (because ψ is
an eigenstate of PI), while neither Pa1 nor Pa2 are true in ψ (because if both
c1 and c2 are diﬀerent from zero ψ is not an eigenstate of Pa1 nor Pa2). And
hence, for the system in state ψ, A does not take value a1 nor does it take
value a2, yet A does take some value. This certainly precludes understanding
disjunction ‘∨’ as an extension of the logical relation ‘or’.
Another particularly relevant example is the following. For incompatible
quantities A and B, the conjunction Pai ∧ Pbj is false under all truth assign-
ments. For example, for a spin 12 particle and an assignment of truth values
Vψ with ψ = c1ψs+z + c2ψs−z , the conjunct Ps+z ∧ Ps+x is false for any c1, c2.
And hence the spin 12 particle can never take both a positive value of spin
along the z-axis and a positive value of spin along the x-axis. This is the fa-
mous non-simultaneity of incompatible observables (in this example Sx and
Sz). Similarly, the non-simultaneity of position and momentum of a quantum
mechanical particle, i.e. the non-localizability of such a particle in arbitrary
regions of both position and momentum, is a consequence of the fact that the
conjunction Pδx∧ Pδp is false under all truth assignments.
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